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I. Introduction 
 
We hear much more about the heroism of St. Thomas Becket, the martyr-archbishop of 
Canterbury, than we hear about the cause for which he made his stand. Becket’s laudable 
courage overshadows the fact that he defied the English king over an issue which would give 
pause to many modern ears: Becket contended that the clergy must have absolute immunity from 
secular law in the area of criminal prosecution. It is no coincidence that the popular 1964 film 
Becket recast the conflict between king and archbishop as a more palatable dispute about a priest 
who had been punished without trial. In real life, Becket’s concern went far beyond due process. 
The questions raised in his time about the clergy’s place in Christian society have resurfaced 
recently in the aftermath of the scandal of clerical sexual abuse. 
 The earliest centuries of Christian history presumed that the clergy were subject to both 
ecclesiastical and secular law, and that the punishment of crime was the purview of secular 
authority. During the Gregorian reform movement in the eleventh century, the advocates of a 
new ecclesiology argued for a clerical hierarchy which was not answerable to any secular power, 
and the authority of the newly systematized canon law provided the basis for a clerical class 
which was exclusively self-policing. Thomas Becket attempted to carry the Gregorian ideals of 
ecclesiastical autonomy and priestly dignity to their logical conclusion by establishing clerical 
immunity as a political reality; both in personal debate and later in his correspondence, he argued 
that no secular authority was competent to impose trial or punishment on a member of the 
ordained clergy. After his death, the English church succeeded in establishing much of the 
immunity for which he had contended. 
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II. Legal status of the clergy in early Christian history 
 
There was little precedent for clerical immunity from secular jurisdiction in the earliest 
centuries of Christian history. For the most part, early Christian authors presumed that the 
Christian, whether cleric or lay, would always have a dual status in temporal society and would 
remain subject to secular law as well as ecclesiastical law. 
In the New Testament, Jesus directed his followers to “repay to Caesar what belongs to 
Caesar and to God what belongs to God,” implying the existence of different but legitimate 
sovereignties.
1
 He claimed to be a king, yet he said that his kingdom was “not of this world.”2 
More specifically, St. Paul encouraged civil obedience, in particular regarding taxation, and he 
himself demonstrated cooperation with Roman law. Paul wrote in the context of a non-Christian 
government, but he was not afraid to assert that all authority comes from God and that the pagan 
ruler is “the servant of God to inflict wrath on the evildoer.”3 At times he relied on Roman rulers 
and Roman laws to protect him from his enemies.4 
As far as legal judgment was concerned, there was some warrant in the New Testament 
for a judicial process internal to the Christian community. Paul reprimanded the Corinthians for 
bringing civil lawsuits before unbelievers rather than settling their affairs among themselves: 
“Do you not know that the holy ones will judge the world? If the world is to be judged by you, 
are you unqualified for the lowest law courts? Do you not know that we will judge angels? Then 
why not everyday matters?”5 However, the concept of the Church exercising its own authority in 
                                                     
1 
Mt. 22:15-22, New American Bible, Revised Edition (Charlotte, NC: St. Benedict Press, 2011). All subsequent 
biblical citations are from this edition.
 
2
 Jn. 18:36. 
3
 Rom. 13:4. 
4
 Acts 22:25-29. 
5
 1 Cor. 6:2-3. 
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a formal judicial setting, much less deploying coercive power to “inflict wrath on the evildoer,” 
did not enter the conception of the New Testament writers. 
Practically speaking, before the conversion of the Empire, Christians living in civil 
society had no choice but to acknowledge themselves subject to two different jurisdictions: civil 
law in matters such as taxation and crime, the Church in matters of moral conduct, truths of the 
Faith, and sacramental worship. In particular, nothing was said to imply that the ordained clergy 
stood any differently in relation to secular authority than did any other Christian. 
The idea that the Church might have a privileged standing before the civil law could only 
begin to develop when the Empire became an explicitly Christian government during the fourth 
century. An anecdote recorded by Rufinus asserted that Constantine was sympathetic to the idea 
that the clergy ought to answer only to divine authority. Rufinus wrote that at the Council of 
Nicaea in 325, the bishops petitioned the emperor to adjudicate a dispute which had arisen 
between them. Constantine refused: “God has appointed you priests and given you power to 
judge even concerning us, and therefore we are rightly judged by you, while you cannot be 
judged by men.”6 Whether or not the story is true, Constantine did absolve the clergy from 
certain public obligations, but he did not put clerical immunity into law.7 
Constantine’s successors laid down vacillating laws about the status of clerics in legal 
proceedings. In general, the emperors were amenable to acknowledging the Church’s 
competence in matters of sacramental discipline and at times even permitted its bishops to act as 
                                                     
6
 Rufinus, Historia ecclesiastica, X.2, trans. Philip R. Amidon, in The Church History of Rufinus of Aquileia, Books 
10 and 11 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 10.  
7
 Theodosian Code 16.2.1, in The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions, trans. Clyde 
Pharr (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952) (hereafter cited as TC). Constantine wrote to the proconsul 
of Africa that the divine worship offered by the Christian clergy was already an “immense contribution to the 
welfare of the community” and that they should be freed from mundane civil responsibilities for this duty. Eusebius, 
Historia ecclesiastica, X.7, trans. G. A. Williamson, The History of the Church from Christ to Constantine 
(Harmondsworth, UK: Dorset, 1965).  
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judges and arbitrators in civil suits,8 but they were reluctant to grant ecclesiastical jurisdiction in 
criminal proceedings.9 Clerics were nevertheless acknowledged as a unique class, and measures 
were taken to respect their dignity — for example, a 452 law declared that although bishops were 
not exempt from civil courts, they could defend themselves through a procurator instead of 
appearing in person.10 Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis provided that a cleric could be formally 
accused of a crime before a secular magistrate and then sent to his bishop for trial; if the bishop 
found him guilty, he was expected to depose him from his clerical office and return him to the 
magistrate for a sentence. If the bishop found him not guilty, the decision would have to be 
confirmed by the magistrate.11 
  At first the Church was in no position to do otherwise than gratefully accept such gifts as 
the emperors chose to bestow. Later the bishops became more vigorous in safeguarding their 
legal privileges. Among the councils that claimed some degree of competence for the Church in 
legal proceedings involving the clergy were Carthage (397), Mileve (416), Arles (442), and 
Chalcedon (451).12 A high point of clerical immunity might be found in Ambrose of Milan, who 
asserted that certain ecclesiastical matters were outside the emperor’s purview, such as church 
buildings: “Sacred things are not subject to the jurisdiction even of the emperor.”13 He exhorted a 
                                                     
8
 Greatly to the chagrin of Augustine as the bishop of Hippo, who lamented the number of hours he was obliged to 
devote daily to judicial responsibilities. Frederik van der Meer, Augustine the Bishop: Religion and Society at the 
Dawn of the Middle Ages (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 258-62.   
9
 Constantius (337-361) granted bishops sole competence in accusations against their own members, although this 
was phrased as a voluntary delegation of his own authority intended to deter wanton accusations against bishops by 
heretics (TC, 16.2.12). Gratianus (375-383) granted civil cases and minor offenses to the bishops’ synods, but 
reserved criminal cases to secular authority (TC, 16.2.23). Honorius (395-423) abrogated this last: “Clerics must not 
be accused except before bishops” (TC, 16.2.41). Valentinian III (425-455) once again reserved all criminal cases to 
the secular courts and decreed that civil cases could only be tried in episcopal courts if both parties agreed (TC, N. 
Val. 3.34). Majorianus (457-461) repealed this. See John Emmanuel Downs, “The Concept of Clerical Immunity” 
(JCD dissertation, Catholic University of America, 1941), 8-10. 
10
 TC, N. Val. 3.34. 
11
 Novellae 123.21, in Corpus Juris Civilis, ed. P. Kreuger and T. Mommsen (Berlin, 1886). 
12
 Downs, “The Concept of Clerical Immunity,” 9-11. 
13
 Ambrose to his sister Marcellina, in Saint Ambrose: Letters, trans. Sister Mary Melchior Beyenka, OP, vol. 26 of 
Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1954), 367. 
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fellow bishop, speaking as Christ: “I…owe nothing to Caesar because I hold nothing of this 
world…Peter owes nothing. My apostles owe nothing, because they are not of this world, 
although they are in the world.”14 Nevertheless, although Ambrose made bold claims for clerical 
immunity from judgments by laymen, he did so not in the context of a judicial setting but with 
regards to deposition for heresy.15 
 Augustine sounded a note of realism a few decades later in his City of God. Augustine’s 
outlook was that the Church should anticipate existing within a foreign, even potentially hostile 
society up until the end of the world. He echoes Paul in saying that secular authorities should be 
respected in matters related to earthly peace, since a peaceful society is a common goal of both 
believers and unbelievers. The Church strives as much as possible to respect the “customs, laws, 
and institutions” established by various governments, so that “since this mortal condition is 
shared by both cities, a harmony may be preserved between them in things that are relevant to 
this condition.”16 The Church cooperates with the civil authority and prays for its success,17 but 
Augustine does not envision it taking an active role in directing secular government or assuming 
its duties. The pilgrim Church has no permanent stake in worldly affairs. 
 A very famous account of the two spheres of authority in which the Christian moves 
simultaneously was articulated by Pope Gelasius I, in a letter to the emperor Anastasius in 494:  
Two there are, august emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, the sacred 
authority of the priesthood and the royal power. Of these the responsibility of the 
priests is more weighty in so far as they will answer for the kings of men 
                                                     
14
 Ambrose to Justus, in St. Ambrose: Letters, 112. 
15
 At the Council of Aquileia (381), which condemned the heretical bishop Palladius, Ambrose stated: “Even if he 
be guilty of many impieties, we still blush that it should seem that he who claims the priesthood for himself is 
condemned by laymen. Both because of and by this very fact, he who awaits the layman’s sentence must be 
condemned, since priests must rather judge concerning laymen.” Gesta concili Aquileiensis, 52; trans. Lester L. 
Field, Liberty, Dominion, and the Two Swords: On the Origins of Western Political Theory (Notre Dame, IN: Notre 
Dame Press, 1998), 213. 
16
 Augustine, City of God, XIX.17, trans. Henry Bettenson, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans 
(London: Penguin Books, 2003), 877. 
17
 Augustine, City of God, XIX.26, 891-92. 
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themselves at the divine judgment. You know, most clement son, that, although 
you take precedence over all mankind in dignity, nevertheless you piously bow 
the neck to those who have charge of divine affairs and seek from them the means 
of your salvation, and hence you realize that, in the order of religion, in matters 
concerning the reception and right administration of the heavenly sacraments, you 
ought to submit yourself rather than rule, and that in these matters you should 
depend on their judgement rather than seek to bend them to your will. For if the 
bishops themselves, recognizing that the imperial office was conferred on you by 
divine disposition, obey your laws so far as the sphere of public order is 
concerned lest they seem to obstruct your decrees in mundane matters, with what 
zeal, I ask you, ought you to obey those who have been charged with 
administering the sacred mysteries?18 
 
Gelasius portrays the two powers as governing two different aspects of Christian life: the 
priests are authorities “concerning the reception and right administration of the heavenly 
sacraments,” the emperor regarding “the sphere of public order.” The Christian is answerable to 
each one in its domain — in fact, each power is answerable to the other. In a later treatise, 
Gelasius emphasizes the healthfulness of this differentiation of the powers: 
Christ, mindful of human frailty, regulated with an excellent disposition what 
pertained to the salvation of his people. Thus he distinguished between the offices 
of both powers according to their own proper activities and separate dignities, 
wanting his people to be saved by healthful humility and not carried away again 
by human pride, so that Christian emperors would need priests for attaining 
eternal life and priests would avail themselves of imperial regulations in the 
conduct of temporal affairs…Thus the humility of each order would be preserved, 
neither being exalted by the subservience of the other.19 
 
As the first passage makes clear, Gelasius considers the priestly power superior in dignity 
because its sacramental ministry has an eschatological role, and the things it stewards are of far 
                                                     
18
 Gelasius I, Letter to Anastasius, in The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300, ed. and trans. Brian Tierney 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 13-14. 
19
 Gelasius I, On the Bond of Anathema, trans. Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 14-15. 
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more enduring value.20 Still, this does not diminish the genuine authority of the other power; both 
derive from Christ’s own office. The emperor is expected to submit to the priests’ judgment in 
things related to the sacraments, but the converse is that it is not only legitimate but salutary for 
the clergy to be judged by him in matters of “public order.”  
There was little leisure for concern about a unique legal position for the clergy during the 
tumultuous centuries between Gelasius and Charlemagne. The disintegration of law and order in 
Western Europe lent weight to the presumption that an effective secular authority was necessary 
to protect the Church and Christian society. Also, the idea of the secular ruler as judge acquired 
further theological legitimacy after the papacy acknowledged Charlemagne and his successors as 
Holy Roman Emperors beginning in 800. It was widely understood that the Christian king was 
more than a “mere layman;” he stood as the leader of the visible Christian society, and protecting 
it from criminal wrongdoers was part of his sacred duty.21 
In the meantime, the organizational power of the ecclesiastical hierarchy was valuable as 
a unifying force to fledgling empires like Charlemagne’s, and the office of bishop or abbot 
became in many places an important position as a feudal landholder. Such officials were 
presumed to be subject to their overlord in affairs of land, military service, and so forth, and 
accordingly they were accountable to him and his courts if accused of wrongdoing. There were 
no exclusively ecclesiastical courts. In the Byzantine and Frankish empires, bishops were 
typically judged by their peers (although priests or members of the lower clerical orders were 
                                                     
20
 Gerd Tellenbach points out how in Gelasius’s account the priesthood has auctoritas, suggesting a religious 
authority, while the empire has only potestas, connoting practical administration. Gerd Tellenbach, Church, State 
and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest, trans. R. F. Bennett (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), 35. 
21
 See Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, trans. S. B. Chrimes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1956), esp. pp. 27-60, “Consecration of the Monarch.” 
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not), but not in a specifically ecclesiastical forum; the courts overlapped and the same clerics 
were officials in both, so it was far from obvious that the Church had charge of the trial.22 
Leading up to the turn-of-the-millennium reform movement, the social position of the 
clergy was very much bound up with the rest of Christian society, and its authorities were 
embedded within royal governing structures. Harold Berman enumerates a number of factors 
which contributed to the situation: clerical marriage allowed for political alliances and 
inheritances; high-ranking clerics were often important secular officials by virtue of their feudal 
positions; much ecclesiastical property was owned by laymen; lay rulers called church councils 
and promulgated ecclesiastical law; and last but not least, secular and ecclesiastical courts were 
interchangeable. There was a “fusion of the religious and political spheres.”23 The reform 
movement would wage war on all of these things. The earlier presumption that the clergy were 
subject simultaneously to both temporal and ecclesiastical authorities was one casualty of the 
conflict. 
 
III. Ideals of the Gregorian reform 
 
The so-called Gregorian reform, a capacious concept sometimes dated from the founding 
of the monastery of Cluny in 910, was one aspect of a wider movement in Christian Europe 
toward general reform at all levels of the Church — a movement which was initiated by lay 
rulers in the ninth century, took hold in the monasteries, and reached the papacy relatively late. 
One current in particular, associated with Gregory VII’s papacy in the eleventh century, 
                                                     
22
 Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), 259. In addition, the “False Decretals” forged around 850 in Rheims asserted that a bishop 
on trial must have the right to appeal to Rome at any point in the proceedings, but this claim would not be 
recognized in practice for some time. Klaus Schatz, Papal Primacy: From Its Origins to the Present (Collegeville, 
MN: Liturgical Press, 1996), 70. 
23
 Berman, Law and Revolution, 88. 
9 
 
engendered a distinct ecclesiology and theology of Christian society.24 Its proponents sought to 
distinguish the ecclesiastical hierarchy as an independent temporal power in its own right. They 
claimed the clergy for their own temporal sovereignty, denying that the clergy owed allegiance 
to the authorities of the secular sphere. Among other things, they asserted the clergy’s right to 
police its own by maintaining a separate judicial system. 
The earliest reformers were prepared to put up with a good deal of control by secular 
authorities over the Church’s temporal affairs, since they shared a common goal — the major 
moral vices targeted by the reform, simony and clerical marriage, were reprehensible to prelates 
and lay Christians alike. The Frankish and German emperors reiterated and enforced the 
Church’s prohibitions in these areas. When the papacy arrived relatively late to the party, 
beginning with Leo IX’s papacy in 1049, the early papal reform councils focused on “simoniacal 
heresy and the evil of clerical marriage.”25 These abuses were attacked passionately as heresies, 
but there was no difficulty at first with lay rulers exercising control over papal and episcopal 
appointments and other matters of ecclesiastical administration.  
However, theological movements were afoot which signaled a more profound change in 
the way the Church understood itself in the world. The pursuit of clerical immunity from secular 
authority developed in the context of what came to be virtually the slogan of the papal reform, 
the “liberty of the Church.” 
The medieval concept of libertas, drawing upon church charters and theological treatises 
of the early medieval period, meant more than freedom from external compulsion; it was 
characterized more as a positive reality than as the mere absence of restraint. In its most 
                                                     
24
 On the divergence of the Gregorian reformers’ project from the goals of the wider reform movement, see Gerd 
Tellenbach, The Church in Western Europe from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century, trans. Timothy Reuter 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 293. 
25
 Adam of Bremen’s account of the Council of Mainz (1049), trans. Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 32.  
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fundamental theological sense, liberty was a paradox: it meant the freedom to be a servant of 
God, the supreme authority.26 In Paul’s words: “You have become freed from sin and have 
become slaves of God.”27 With regards to the law which governed the Christian’s conduct as a 
servant of God, liberty was viewed in the context of the complementarity of moral rights and 
duties. A given person or entity might have more or fewer responsibilities and hence more or 
fewer “liberties.”28 A local church, for instance, might be said to become “more free” when it 
was given more extensive faculties to administer the sacraments.29  
Leading up to the eleventh century, the clergy were increasingly characterized as being 
particularly set apart for servitude under Christ, and for this reason required to be free from other 
authorities in order to fulfill their duties as Christ’s servants. Humbert of Silva Candida, one of 
the reform-minded cardinals at Rome in the mid-eleventh century, lamented: “They who ought to 
be freer than all, whose inheritance is God Himself, and who therefore are the property of God, 
are less valued than any others. The lowest serf is subject to his own lord, but the clergy are 
expected to serve strange masters.”30  
There was increasing conviction that the libertas of the clergy meant freedom from lay 
authority, so that the clergy could pursue a divinely appointed mission of governing the visible 
Church.31 In practice, when the reformers spoke of the libertas Ecclesiae, they typically meant 
the freedom of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to be self-governed, to be ruled by its own laws, and 
                                                     
26
 Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society, 2. 
27
 Rom. 6:22. 
28
 A distinction from the Roman legal concept of freedom, which sharply distinguished the freedom of persons from 
the status of slaves as “things.” Even the least powerful members of medieval society were said to have certain 
“liberties.” Ellen Meiksins Wood describes the transition to feudal society as a shift from a black-and-white 
free/slave distinction to “a complex continuum of dependent conditions.” Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian 
Society, 18-22; Ellen Meiksins Wood, Citizens to Lords: A Social History of Western Political Thought from 
Antiquity to the Middle Ages (London: Verso, 2008), 171. 
29
 Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society, 22. 
30
 Humbert of Silva Candida, Liber contra simoniacos, III.10, trans. Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian 
Society, 134-35. 
31
 Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society, 19. 
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especially to be ruled by the pope. They desired to be free in order to be subject to the highest 
authority, Christ himself, and this authority was increasingly seen as residing most fully in the 
pope, not in a divinely anointed king.32 
The libertas of the clergy entailed corresponding privileges in the thought of the 
reformers. In the same way that liberty was no mere absence of restraint, a privilegium was not a 
mere exemption from law. It was the practical manifestation of one’s particular liberty, the 
means required to exercise one’s proper standing before God and his law.33 A member of the 
clergy needed certain privileges to fulfill his particular function. A bishop, for instance, was said 
to require the privilege of ruling and administering the lands and possessions that were attached 
to his office. Considering the office and its material manifestation as a single entity was a useful 
argument against simony, since some had justified the practice of paying for ecclesiastical office 
on the grounds that the candidate was purchasing the material possessions of the office, not the 
sacramental consecration.34 However, this also made it difficult to maintain the old duality in the 
office-holder’s loyalties, to view him as simultaneously subject to distinct ecclesiastical and 
secular jurisdictions. The Gregorian reformers eventually objected to all manifestations of this 
dual loyalty — they contended that a cleric ought not to be appointed by a lay ruler, hold a 
church as the vassal of a lay lord, or formally receive ecclesiastical property from a layman in the 
                                                     
32
 As Schatz notes (Papal Primacy, 81-82), not only the diocesan clergy but also the religious orders sought liberty 
in being subject to the pope alone. This trend began with the monastery of Cluny, whose charter placed it under the 
direct authority of the pope, but was even more dramatically visible with the mendicant orders of the thirteenth 
century, whose forms of organization were incompatible with traditional diocesan governance structures. 
33
 Humbert links the privilege of any possession with the right to pursue its proper use — the privilege of land is 
possessing and cultivating it; for a horse, the right to ride upon it; in the case of a position in the Church hierarchy, 
such as a bishopric, the privilege includes the right to rule and administer its temporal goods. Tellenbach, Church, 
State, and Christian Society, 17. 
34
 The tenth-century monk Abbo of Fleury criticized those who claimed to be purchasing only the Church’s material 
possessions: “It is evident that in the Catholic church the one cannot exist without the other. Or can there be fire 
without fuel?” The monk Wido wrote that a local church “cannot exist without its temporalities, as the soul cannot 
exist in time without the body.” Humbert of Silva Candida argued that that the one who conferred a bishopric on a 
candidate necessarily bestowed an entire indivisible entity, spiritual authority along with temporal administration 
over property, and that for this reason it was absolutely unacceptable for a layman to perform the investiture 
ceremony. Tellenbach, The Church in Western Europe, 170-77. 
12 
 
rite of investiture. Ultimately, one of the privileges claimed for the clergy was the privilegium 
fori, the privilege of being judged only by fellow clerics. Pope Paschal II defended the claim to 
exclusive jurisdiction with Paul’s words: “Who are you to pass judgment on someone else’s 
servant?”35  
The second and most dramatic phase of the papal branch of the reform, the pontificate of 
Gregory VII (1073-1085), discarded entirely the concept of the cleric as subject to two 
autonomous spheres of authority. Gregory argued for a supreme, “un-judgeable” temporal 
authority exercised by the pope in particular and by the clergy in general. He wrote that it was 
part of the nature of the priesthood to judge and condemn earthly authorities, and that the reverse 
was a reprehensible sacrilege. The gist of his argument is that since priests enjoy supreme 
authority in the administration of the sacraments, it is impossible for them to not have the same 
preeminence in earthly affairs:  
To whom, then, the power of opening and closing Heaven is given, shall he not be 
able to judge the earth? God forbid! Do you remember what the most blessed 
Apostle Paul says: “Know ye not that we shall judge angels? How much more the 
things that pertain to this life?”36  
 
Gregory took in its most literal sense the old axiom prima sedes a nemine judicatur, “the first see 
is judged by no one.”37 
Gregory’s most striking (and infamous) rhetoric comes from his defense of the 
supremacy of priestly authority, but with regards to the question of clerical immunity from 
secular jurisdiction, the more significant issue was the exclusivity of priestly authority in its own 
                                                     
35
 Rom. 14:4; Tellenbach, Church, State, and Christian Society, 135. 
36
 Gregory VII, Letter to Hermann of Metz (1081), trans. Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 68. 
37
 Prima sedes had been part of the canonical tradition since the fifth century, primarily in the context of the 
conundrum of whether a pope could be deposed from his office. It acquired a stronger juridical connotation after 
Charlemagne exonerated Pope Leo III of various criminal charges in 800. It was included, along with other robust 
assertions of papal supremacy in both ecclesiastical and secular governance, in the eleventh-century Dictatus papae 
— a document which cannot be associated with Gregory’s direct authorship but which undoubtedly represents his 
ideals. Schatz, Papal Primacy, 73-75.  
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purview — a purview which was no longer confined to the priest’s sacramental ministry, but 
now included every aspect of his life and responsibilities. The question of the cleric’s double 
identity as temporal official and ordained minister was the source of the best-known conflict of 
the reform period, the Investiture Contest. Gregory and his supporters denied the right of the lay 
sovereign to confer authority on a cleric in the investiture ceremony, and more fundamentally, 
denied the sovereign’s right to choose the candidate for the office.38 They did not acknowledge 
the fact that in much of Europe, a prelate automatically became a temporal ruler by virtue of his 
office — as Brian Tierney puts it, “the management of material estates does not become a 
spiritual activity simply because bishops are set in charge of them”!39 
After the initial heat of the dispute had abated, more pragmatic leaders acknowledged that 
in practice the Church’s temporal authority existed alongside others who occupied the same 
space. Significantly, the Investiture Contest ended in a compromise which set a precedent for 
future turf wars between clerical and secular rulers. Pope Calixtus II and Emperor Henry V 
agreed to the Concordat of Worms in 1122. The emperor conceded that bishops would be elected 
by the clergy in accordance with ecclesiastical law, but he retained considerable influence over 
the choice: the emperor could present a nominee; the election was to occur in his presence 
where, in the event of disagreement, he could provide “assent and assistance to the party which 
appears to have the better case;” he had veto power, since he could either receive or refuse the 
                                                     
38
 As Z. N. Brooke points out, the dispute over investiture, although it has given its name to the colorful battle of 
wills between the pope and emperor, was in fact secondary to the issue of control over ecclesiastical appointments. 
While Gregory did begin to enforce the formal prohibition against investiture by laymen that had been promulgated 
by a Roman synod in 1059, investiture is barely mentioned in the impassioned correspondence between him and 
Henry IV. The breach between them had actually begun years earlier with a dispute over who had the right to 
appoint a candidate for the archbishopric of Milan. Nevertheless, investiture was a perfect symbol of what was at 
stake — who had authority over which aspects of the clerical persona? — and it was on these grounds that the 
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homage of the elected candidate. The symbols of authority were distinguished: the bishop would 
confer the ring and staff, while the emperor’s part of the ceremony would use a royal scepter. 
The arrangement acknowledged, both in practice and in the imagery of the ritual, that the clerical 
hierarchy and the kingship both had a legitimate claim on the bishop’s loyalty and a legitimate 
jurisdiction over him in their own spheres.40  
In the years of Gregory’s immediate successors, the papal branch of the reform focused 
on practical steps to increase the Church’s standing as a political entity in its own right. It did not 
assert authority over all human affairs, but it sought autonomy in the areas which it did claim as 
its purview, including oversight of the clergy.41 The project of increasing the Church’s temporal 
presence and autonomy did not necessarily reflect the consensus of the Church or even of the 
episcopate; however, it influenced the policy of the papacy for the next several centuries, and as 
will be seen, it was the worldview that motivated Thomas Becket.  
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IV. Developments in canon law 
 
For the purposes of the debate over clerical immunity, one of the most significant 
developments during the century between Gregory and Becket was the crystallization of the new 
claims in canon law. Along with the new emphasis on the Church as a temporal reality came the 
development of new structures to respond to temporal needs, including the systematization of a 
sophisticated body of law to regulate the Church’s internal government in both spiritual and 
temporal matters. 
The eleventh and twelfth centuries saw a renewed interest in law in general and in its 
ability to govern the relationships between various spheres of society, including not only the law 
of the institutional Church but also mercantile law, royal law, manorial law, and urban law.42 
However, canon law was seen as more than simply one of the many systems on offer. All just 
law was understood to participate in the eternal justice of God, but canon law was considered to 
have a particularly close relationship to the eternal law: it was based on divine revelation as 
found in Scripture and magisterial tradition, and therefore was more reliable than laws 
determined by human endeavor. As such, canon law trumped forms of positive law which 
originated from merely human wisdom.43 The most significant of the twelfth-century law texts, 
Gratian’s Decretum, cites many authorities to argue that “enactments of princes do not stand 
above ecclesiastical enactments, but are subordinate to them.” At the same time, secular law is 
said to be praiseworthy, especially when it protects the Church, and deserving of obedience so 
long as it does not conflict with canon law.44 
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Canon law was not new in the Gregorian period, of course; bishops, councils, and popes 
had made laws since the time of the apostles, including both “religious” laws about sacramental 
discipline and practical rules for life in civil society. The very antiquity of the accumulated 
canons was a large part of their authority. What was new was the interest in collecting them, 
organizing them, and at times editing them to serve the new ideal of the Church’s temporal 
autonomy.45 
The most ambitious of the new compilations was the one completed around 1139 by the 
Bolognese scholar Gratian, the Concordia Discordantium Canonum, better known in shorthand 
as the Decretum. It was so definitive that it put an end to its own genre. Gratian’s work was 
remarkable for its effort to synthesize the thousands of canons, reconcile their contradictions, and 
derive from them abstract legal norms. It was already ubiquitous and quasi-official by the time of 
the Becket dispute twenty years later: the papal chancery presumed its correspondents’ 
familiarity with it; Alexander III, the pope during Becket’s time, was a respected canonist by 
profession and wrote a summa of Gratian’s work; and Becket himself studied the Decretum in 
exile and drew upon its authorities to argue for the privileges of the clergy. In particular, two 
areas of law covered by the Decretum were directly pertinent to the Becket dispute: the 
jurisdiction of ecclesiastical and secular courts over clerics, and relatedly, the extent of the 
Church’s capacity to inflict judicial punishment.  
Gratian directly addressed clerical immunity in Causa 11 in the second part of his work. 
He gives a fictional example in which several clerics sue a fellow cleric in a secular court over a 
                                                     
45
 David Knowles remarks that during this period of Church history, canon law briefly overtook theology proper as 
the dominant discipline. Put another way, the ordering of the Church’s temporal life through law became the 
dominant theological interest of this period. David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1962); Stanley Chodorow, Christian Political Theory and Church Politics in the Mid-Twelfth 
Century: The Ecclesiology of Gratian’s Decretum (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 3. 
17 
 
property dispute. Gratian then poses a broader question: Should a cleric be tried before a secular 
judge?46  
Gratian lists authorities on both sides of the question, including popes, councils, 
theologians, and even secular lawmakers. The majority prohibit bringing a cleric into a secular 
court, although there are also a number which assert the legitimate superiority of secular law in 
secular matters. Gratian then provides a dense summary: 
By all these things one understands that action should not be brought against 
clerics in secular courts, that just as the judges of the Holy Church are 
administrators of the things of the church, so also no one except secular judges 
should undertake secular matters. And just as he who makes canons has the power 
to interpret them, so also should he interpret the secular laws who gives them 
force and authority. In criminal causes clerics should not be accused except before 
their bishop. This is what was previously established by law and by the canons, 
that no cleric should be brought for a criminal cause before a secular judge 
without the consent of his bishop; if he will not amend his ways, then he should 
be deposed and delivered over to the court.47  
 
Gratian supports clerical immunity by citing various secular laws, including the 
Theodosian Code and the Capitularies of Charlemagne, but ultimately he bases it on divine 
authority.48 Significantly, he notes the argument that that bishops should be subject to the pope ex 
officio and to the king ex possessionibus — the compromise which had quieted the Investiture 
Contest, and a position for which he cites no less an authority than Augustine — but he denies 
that this means clerics are subject to the king’s courts.49 Instead, he identifies clerics as persons 
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set apart from secular jurisdiction, distinct from “secular persons.”50 Clerics are not like ordinary 
men, who are subject to both sovereignties; the business of the cleric, whether spiritual or 
temporal, is de facto the business of ecclesiastical authority.51 
Gratian distinguishes between criminal and civil cases and acknowledges that the latter 
have a secular character, since they deal with worldly possessions. Nevertheless, when clerics are 
involved, the Church is to judge the case regardless of the nature of the litigation, and the 
prohibition against bringing clerics to a secular court applies equally to each situation. At the 
same time, Gratian allows for scenarios in each type of case where part or all of the task might be 
delegated to the secular courts:  
Actions against clerics should not be brought before secular judges, either in civil 
or criminal cases, provided that the case is not a civil one which the bishops do 
not wish to hear, or a criminal one for which the cleric has been deposed.52  
 
In civil cases, the bishop might waive his right of jurisdiction over the more mundane dealings of 
his clergy in favor of a secular court. In criminal cases, in which the cleric’s own person was at 
stake, the secular courts could only acquire jurisdiction if the Church chose to expel the cleric 
from the canonical clerical state. Gratian does not explicitly describe the circumstances in which 
a cleric would be removed from the clerical state, but it seems reasonable to infer that he 
envisions this occurring in the situation described in canon 30 above, where the accused cleric 
“will not amend his ways” and it is beyond the Church’s power to restrain him. 
A closely related question is taken up later in Gratian’s work, the question of judicial 
punishment. If the clerical hierarchy is primarily responsible for judging and punishing its own 
members, what form ought this punishment to take? It could not simply mirror the practice of the 
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secular courts, because the canon law prohibited clerics from imposing corporal punishment. 
Gratian cites the Council of Toledo (675), which stated that those responsible for administering 
the sacraments could not condemn anyone to a “judgment of blood” such as mutilation or 
death.53 Also, physical punishment was considered unseemly for the cleric, who stood in persona 
Christi.54 The clerical judges were left with two alternatives. One was to eschew corporal 
punishment altogether and rely on non-sanguinary penalties such as fines or imprisonment, or on 
ecclesiastical sanctions such as loss of office or of clerical status altogether. The other was to 
permit a non-clerical authority to prescribe and carry out the sentence, circumventing the 
objection to inflicting punishment on one in persona Christi by first removing the offender from 
the clerical state. The latter was fraught with complication because it obliged the ecclesiastical 
government to navigate the relationship between its own authority and that of the lay power 
intervening on its behalf. 
There was a long tradition for regarding coercive punishment as part of the divinely 
ordained duty of the secular power, often expressed in terms of the biblical metaphor of the two 
swords.55 As noted above, even figures like Paul and Augustine, who were speaking of a not 
necessarily Christian government, described the main responsibility of secular authority as 
maintaining temporal peace for both Christians and unbelievers. In the eleventh century, the 
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Roman cardinal Peter Damian offered this view, reprising Gelasius’s account of the two 
complementary powers: 
The priesthood is defended by the royal protection while the kingship is sustained 
by the holiness of the priestly office. The king is girded with a sword so that he 
may go armed against the enemies of the church. The priest devotes himself to 
vigils of prayer so that he may win God’s favor for king and people…The former 
is established to coerce evil doers and criminals with the punishment of legal 
sanctions; the latter is ordained for this, to bind some with the zeal of canonical 
rigor through the keys of the church that he has received and to absolve others 
through the clemency of the church’s compassion.56 
 
A century later, John of Salisbury articulated the Gregorian corollary of this principle: the king is 
“a minister of the priestly power, and one who exercises that side of the sacred offices which 
seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood.”57 Gratian himself cites many authorities to argue 
the familiar position that the secular power ought to come to the Church’s aid when physical 
force is needed to protect its interests.58 
 Several passages from the Decretum seemed to imply that the case of a deposed cleric 
was one in which the secular power might intervene to accomplish what the Church’s priests 
could not themselves do. A number of canons among those cited by Gratian stated that the 
deposed cleric should be “delivered over to the court,” traditur curiae. The most familiar 
meaning of curia was that of a place or court of law, and during the Becket dispute some 
concluded that this meant the cleric should be handed over to a secular court for physical 
punishment after his ecclesiastical trial.59 However, this was not the unambiguous consensus of 
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the sources which Gratian cited, especially when considered in their original contexts.60 In 
Gratian’s own commentary on the sources, traditur curiae sometimes includes the idea of 
consignment to secular justice, he did not directly equate the two. As noted above, Gratian did 
foresee the possibility of secular authority taking a hand in the punishment of an accused cleric 
in a situation where “the cleric has been deposed,” but the implication of this passage is that this 
should occur only at the bishop’s initiative, and as the exception in the case of an incorrigible 
offender, not the rule. 
 In summary, the Decretum lent bite to the reformers’ bark by providing a substantial 
body of authorities to support the clerical hierarchy’s right to govern legal proceedings involving 
its own members. Gratian allowed that secular authority might have some role in trial and 
punishment in certain situations, but not in such a way as to supersede the Church’s primary 
right of jurisdiction over members of the clergy. 
 
V. English precedent for clerical immunity 
 
However vigorously the canons might assert clerical privilege, the Becket conflict 
occurred in the context of the English legal and political situation, where the precedent for 
clerical immunity was ambiguous.  
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Anglo-Saxon law had not recognized a fundamental difference between law for the 
clergy and law for the laity, but some distinction was acknowledged. It was generally undisputed 
that clergy had a special honored status and deserved particular protection, especially since an 
unmarried clergyman was in some sense without the protection of tribe or kin.61 Pastoral 
manuals, such as Theodore’s Penitential in the seventh century, commented that clergy ought to 
be subject to the judgments of their bishops, but it is not clear whether this meant bishops 
exclusively, or exactly what sort of judgment was intended.62 Practically speaking, as long as 
there was no exclusively ecclesiastical court system, there was no real separation of jurisdiction; 
bishops likely had some involvement in cases involving accusations against their clerics, but 
these took place in the same shire and hundred courts to which the rest of England had 
recourse.63 As on the Continent, the king made ecclesiastical law regarding clerical discipline; 
Alfred’s late ninth-century laws, for instance, directed a bishop to remove from orders a priest 
who had committed homicide.64  
William the Conqueror became king of England in 1066. He did so with papal approval, 
in light of his stated goal of restoring liberty and proper ecclesiastical governance to the Church 
in the disorganized country (the irony does not appear to have struck anyone during the later 
dispute).65 William set about putting England’s house in order, which entailed among other 
things establishing a more efficient judicial system. While William was generally supportive of 
the moral aims of the reform, including opposition to simony and clerical marriage, his 
administration did not keep pace with Gregorian ideals for clerical privilege in the judicial 
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forum. William issued an ordinance establishing a separation of jurisdiction between secular and 
episcopal courts: 
I have ordained that the episcopal laws shall be amended, because before my time 
these were not properly administered in England according to the precepts of the 
holy canons. Wherefore I order, and by my royal authority I command, that no 
bishop or archdeacon shall henceforth hold pleas relating to the episcopal laws in 
the hundred court; nor shall they bring to the judgment of secular men any matter 
which concerns the rule of souls; but anyone cited under the episcopal laws in 
respect of any plea of crime shall come to the place which the bishop shall choose 
and name, and there he shall plead his case, or answer for the crime. He shall not 
be tried according to the law of the hundred court, but he shall submit to the 
justice of God and his bishop in accordance with the canons and the episcopal 
laws. Moreover, if anyone, puffed up with pride, shall refuse to come to the 
bishop’s court, he shall be summoned three times, and if, after this, he shall still 
fail to appear, he shall be excommunicated; and if the strength and justice of the 
king and his sheriff shall be needed to carry this into effect, this support will be 
forthcoming.66  
  
The ordinance allocated jurisdiction not based on the status of the individual litigant, but on the 
nature of the litigation: cases were separated depending on whether they concerned the 
“episcopal laws” or the king’s laws. Notably, William committed himself to backing up the 
Church with force if this should be necessary to enforce its judgment — a step that the majority 
of European kingdoms did not take (although the legal procedures for this cooperation would not 
be fully worked out until the thirteenth century).67  
 William’s kingship was a theocratic monarchy in which, to quote the contemporary 
historian Eadmer, “all things spiritual and temporal alike waited upon the nod of the King.”68 The 
papacy’s attempts to regulate ecclesiastical affairs were consistently rebuffed not only by the 
monarchy but also by the English episcopate, especially Archbishop Lanfranc of Canterbury, 
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who worked hand in glove with the king. Rome tolerated the situation out of sympathy for 
William’s efforts to restore law and order, as well as out of fear of jeopardizing England’s 
loyalty to the papacy.69 Open schism seemed nearer a generation later when Archbishop Anselm, 
whose conscience was more delicate than those of his predecessors, sided with Rome against the 
king over the provocative issue of investiture. Happily the king, archbishop, and pope were able 
to anticipate the compromise at Worms by some fifteen years: in the Concordat of London in 
1107, the king renounced investiture, although he still retained considerable indirect control over 
the election and had the right to receive homage from the chosen candidate.70 W. L. Warren 
comments on the significance of this compromise: 
It meant the abandonment of the attempt at a clear separation of clergy and laity: 
henceforth the line of separation was to be drawn instead between the spiritual 
and secular aspects of the clerical persona. The sharp distinction between the 
Church and the World harboured by the revolutionaries of the Gregorian era now 
dimmed, and the clergy found themselves with dual loyalties to Church and State 
— loyalties that were demanding but ill-defined.71 
 
Legal jurisdiction was undoubtedly one of the areas that was as yet ill-defined. Although 
the Conqueror’s ordinance had reserved criminal cases to the secular courts, in practice the 
treatment of jurisdiction over accused clerics was ambiguous. It was notable that Archbishop 
Lanfranc had to find a pretext to help William try Bishop Odo of Bayeux for treason — Odo was 
said to be liable to a secular trial in his capacity as an earl, not as a member of the clergy. A 
similar case was brought against the bishop of Durham during the reign of the next king, 
although its outcome is not certain.72 The anonymous Leges Henrici Primi, from the early twelfth 
century, states plainly: “The bishops should have jurisdiction of all accusations, whether major 
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or minor, made against those in holy orders.”73 Still, it is not obvious whether this is descriptive 
or prescriptive, a statement of fact or of ideal. 
The English bishops got a taste of libertas during the reign of King Stephen (1135-1154), 
when the unsettled political situation prevented the king from taking much oversight of 
ecclesiastical affairs and obliged him to make concessions to maintain the bishops’ support. In 
his 1136 charter at Oxford, Stephen conceded to the bishops a number of liberties, including 
clerical immunity: “Jurisdiction and authority over ecclesiastical persons and over all clerks and 
their property, together with the disposal of ecclesiastical estates, shall lie in the hands of the 
bishops.”74  
A few years later in 1139, the bishops were outraged when the king imprisoned one of 
their number, Roger of Salisbury, on charges of treason, without first accusing the bishop in an 
ecclesiastical court. The bishops convened to conduct Roger’s trial themselves. The king’s 
representative resorted to the justification Lanfranc had supplied fifty years earlier: he claimed 
that Roger had not been imprisoned not in his capacity as a cleric but as a royal official. This 
time the bishops would have none of it. The bishop of Winchester, Henry of Blois, opened the 
discussion by commenting that the imprisonment of bishops by secular rulers used to be a 
frequent occurrence, implying that there were different expectations now. He stated that the 
charges and investigation should have occurred in an ecclesiastical procedure in accordance with 
canon law, not a secular sentence without trial. The trial ended inconclusively after King Stephen 
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appealed to Rome, but the bishops’ anger did lasting damage to the king’s political position. The 
climate had changed since the days of William and Lanfranc.75 
By the time Stephen was succeeded by Henry II in 1154, it was evident that regardless of 
who had the better argument in theology or canon law, the English bishops had bitten off far 
more than they could chew by assuming responsibility for all clerical jurisdiction in the country. 
Their resources were inadequate to deal effectively with the scope of clerical crime. There were 
many clerics in England, the vast majority of whom were not priests but members of the minor 
orders. For most of them, there was little to distinguish them from laymen in way of life: many 
had families to support; the majority were poorly educated and did not possess an ecclesiastical 
benefice; supervision or discipline by the bishop was infrequent. The ecclesiastical justice 
system was ineffective and handicapped by the canonical prohibition on corporal punishment.76 
A Norman cleric, Nicolas of Mont-Rouen, described a conversation he had in 1163 with 
King Henry II’s mother, Empress Matilda, in which they assessed the situation together: 
Bishops do ordain clerks indiscriminately, without title to churches, from which it 
follows that a crowd of ordained men fall into shameful acts through poverty and 
idleness. Such a one is not afraid to lose his church, because he is assigned to no 
church. He does not fear penalty, because the Church will protect him. He does 
not fear the bishop’s prison, for the bishop prefers to let him live unpunished than 
take on himself the trouble of feeding and guarding him.77 
 
The chronicler William of Newburgh, writing forty years later, criticized the bishops of 
this period for their negligence: 
The bishops however, while anxious rather to maintain the liberties or rights of 
the clergy than to correct and root out their vices, suppose that they do God 
service, and the church also, by defending against established law those 
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abandoned clergy, whom they either refuse or neglect to restrain, as their office 
enjoins, by the vigour of canonical censure. Hence the clergy, who, called into the 
inheritance of the Lord, ought to shine on earth, in their lives and conversation, 
like stars placed in the firmament of heaven, yet take licence and liberty to do 
what they please with impunity.78 
 
Even when a cleric was brought to judgment, his ecclesiastical trial might well be 
perceived as toothless by comparison with its secular counterpart. The ecclesiastical courts 
avoided physical methods of obtaining proof, such as ordeal or battle, and most often fell back 
on compurgation, in which the accused was required to prove his innocence by supporting his 
own declarations with the oaths of others who vouched for his credibility.79  
Clerical crime was by no means the only issue in need of housekeeping when Henry II 
became king in 1154. In the aftermath of the civil wars during Stephen’s reign, violent crime was 
in fact a widespread problem at all levels of society, not just among the clerical class. 
Nevertheless, the situation was still deplorable, and the idea of atrocities committed by members 
of the clergy was, as it is today, particularly scandalous. 
 
VI. Becket’s arguments for clerical privilege 
 
At this point, the stage was set for the conflict between Henry II and Thomas Becket. It 
was not like the debate between Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV a century earlier, when both 
sides supported their positions with passionate theological arguments. In this case the theology 
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was one-sided, supplied almost exclusively by Becket, and none of it was original to him. 
However, the dispute over clerical immunity was a playing out of the implications of the new 
vision of the clergy’s position in society: the Gregorian ideal of a self-governing clerical 
hierarchy had to come to terms with the realities of existing in a society whose ruler had a 
legitimate duty to protect his realm.80 
Henry II was crowned king of England in 1154, but wars in his continental lands kept 
him away from England for much of the first decade of his reign. During this period, several 
incidents exposed the drawbacks of regarding the clergy as self-policing and unaccountable to 
secular authority. 
Late in Stephen’s reign, a cleric of the diocese of York, the archdeacon Osbert, was 
charged with murdering his own archbishop. Osbert claimed that as a cleric, he could only be 
tried by the Church. Stephen disagreed on account of the magnitude of the crime, but when 
Henry became king he consented with misgivings to allow the ecclesiastical courts to handle the 
case. The results cast no credit on the Church. The case dragged on for a year without either 
proving or disproving Osbert’s guilt, and when Osbert was at last ordered to support his 
innocence by compurgation, he promptly appealed to Rome and the entire process was derailed 
(a situation which is unfortunately familiar in modern canon law as well). The ecclesiastical 
courts had not yet developed procedures that would permit the effective administration of justice 
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in accordance with the principles of canon law. Even the then-Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Theobald, blamed the miscarriage of justice on “the subtlety of the law and the canons.”81 
In addition to Osbert’s case, the trial of an alleged blackmailer in 1158 was frustrated by 
the invocation of clerical privilege. The king objected, but he was called away from the country 
before he could organize a secular trial.82 The following year a counterfeiter in Normandy was 
released from prison on account of his clerical status, although he still had to forfeit his 
possessions and go into exile.83 
Henry settled his affairs on the Continent and returned to England in 1163. Restoring 
effective royal administration, including reforming the judicial system, was now one of his chief 
priorities. In the matter of clerical crime, he no doubt anticipated the assistance of Thomas 
Becket, lately his chancellor and now the newly appointed Archbishop of Canterbury.  
The king heard complaints about the ineffectiveness of ecclesiastical judgments, 
including the allegation that over a hundred murders had been committed by clerics since his 
coronation.84 When the king attempted to prosecute three of the worst crimes, Becket quickly 
intervened to retrieve the accused clerics for the Church. Becket was not insensitive to the fact 
that the ecclesiastical courts were perceived as scandalously lenient, and he felt the need to 
impose a less toothless punishment than the loss of clerical status.85 However, he proceeded to 
antagonize both the king and his fellow bishops by imposing a sentence of banishment on one 
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cleric and branding on another, both of which overstepped royal prerogatives and the latter of 
which affronted the canonical prohibition on corporal punishment.86 In the months that followed, 
there were several more clashes between the king and the new archbishop over areas in which 
Becket had contravened the law of the land.87 
The question of jurisdiction over clerics was finally raised in the open at a council in 
Westminster in October 1163. Henry told the eleven English bishops that clerics convicted of 
major crimes ought to be “deprived of the protection of the Church” and turned over to royal 
officers for corporal punishment. He argued that physical punishment was more likely to deter 
future crime, and that its severity was appropriate since the clergy ought to be held to a higher 
standard of moral conduct. Unexpectedly, he also presented an argument from canon law: his 
advisers cited canons from Gratian’s Decretum which included the concept of traditio curiae, 
interpreting these to mean that the accused cleric was to be handed over to the secular court for 
physical punishment after his ecclesiastical trial. Henry’s proposal was an abrupt departure from 
the status quo, but it was in some ways a limited one: the king did not demand that the cleric be 
tried in a secular court, but only that the secular court should administer the punishment after the 
Church had found fault; nor was he claiming jurisdiction over every offense, but only over major 
crimes which presumably involved a more dangerous suspect. The proposal resembled the 
process outlined in the Corpus Juris Civilis, where a bishop could judge a cleric guilty, deprive 
him of clerical orders, and return him to the regular court for sentence.88 
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Becket delivered a lengthy rejoinder to the king. According to one eyewitness, he argued 
on theological grounds that the king had no right to assert jurisdiction over the clergy. He 
described two distinct spheres of legitimate authority within the Church: 
My lord king, sacrosanct Church, mother of all kings and priests, has two kings, 
two laws, two jurisdictions and two penalties. Two kings, Christ the heavenly 
king and the earthly king; two laws, human and divine; two jurisdictions, priestly 
and lay; and two means of coercion, spiritual and corporal.89 
 
With regards to governance of the clergy, the two spheres do not overlap: “Kings have no 
jurisdiction in these things.” The clergy are set apart entirely for their own law:  
Clerics, by reason of order and office have Christ alone as king…And since under 
their own king, the King of heaven, not worldly kings, they are ruled by their own 
law, and if they transgress, are penalized by their own law, which has its own 
penalty.90 
 
 As for the suggestion that clerics be subjected to corporal punishment, Becket appealed to 
the dignity of the priesthood; he protested that the body which performs a sacred office at the 
altar should not be disfigured or humiliated, “lest in man the image of God should be 
deformed.”91 He denounced the combination of degradation from orders and corporal punishment 
as a kind of double jeopardy, saying that “God does not judge twice in the same matter.”92 He 
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argued that the traditio curiae texts referred to degradation from clerical orders, not punishment 
by a secular court of law.93 
 Henry made no attempt to refute this manifesto on theological or canonical grounds. He 
fell back on an appeal to the fact that secular jurisdiction over clerics had been the norm for 
much of England’s recent history. He requested each bishop to swear a general oath promising to 
uphold the “customs” of the past. Led by Becket, the bishops consented to take the oath in 
conditional language only, with the caveat that they would observe the customs “saving their 
order.”94 
 Henry, having failed to obtain a general promise from the bishops, resorted to specifying 
the prerogatives he wished to secure. In the weeks following Westminster, Becket was persuaded 
by a papal mission and his fellow bishops to offer a personal pledge to the king that he would 
obey the customs of the realm, without the provocative clause about his order. The king, not 
satisfied, summoned the bishops to a council at Clarendon in January 1164.95 The bishops arrived 
apparently under the impression that they would be called upon to echo Becket’s expression of 
loyalty in a general form. To their dismay, they found themselves confronted with a demand that 
they take an unconditional oath to observe a carefully defined list of “customs,” the Constitutions 
of Clarendon. 
 The list Henry presented at Clarendon has been preserved in a form which indicates 
which of the sixteen propositions were condemned or tolerated by Pope Alexander III. They 
outlined various prerogatives of the king in areas of intersection between ecclesiastical and royal 
government. R. H. Helmholz categorizes the canons by three objectives: defining jurisdiction in 
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matters such as advowson, oaths, and clerical crime; regulating legal procedures used in the 
ecclesiastical courts; and asserting the king’s rights regarding episcopal actions such as elections, 
travel, and excommunications.96 Some of them, such as a canon about homage to the king by a 
newly appointed bishop, merely confirmed the status quo, but others, such as a prohibition on 
appeals to Rome without the king’s consent, meant a contravention of canon law that had not 
been hitherto required in the bishops’ lifetimes. In particular, canon 3 articulated a new policy 
for jurisdiction over clerics: 
Clerks charged and accused of any offence, when summoned by the king’s 
justice, shall come to the king’s court to answer there concerning what seems to 
the king’s court ought to be answered there, and in the ecclesiastical court for 
what seems ought to be answered there, but in such a way that the justice of the 
king sends men into the court of Holy Church to see in what way it is tried there. 
And if the clerk should be convicted or confesses, the Church ought no longer to 
protect him.97 
 
The wording of the canon is notoriously vague (“what seems ought to be answered 
there”) and lacks the precision typical of Henry’s laws. The most commonly accepted 
interpretation is the following: every cleric accused of a crime was to be formally accused before 
a royal justice and then sent to the Church for trial, where the proceedings would occur in the 
presence of a royal official; and if the accused were found guilty, he was to be returned 
immediately to the royal justice for a sentence of corporal punishment.98 
Certain elements of this scenario were palatable from the point of view of canon law: the 
ecclesiastical court retained the trial, there was no mention of the controversial traditio curiae; 
the Church was exonerated of double jeopardy and of blood punishment insofar as it had no 
involvement in the final sentence. In fact, if the law had envisioned this as a procedure to be 
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followed in exceptional cases when the Church found itself unable to restrain a particularly 
contumacious offender, this would have corresponded to the approach described in Gratian’s 
Decretum. However, if the king intended this to be the de facto manner of proceeding, that the 
ecclesiastical trial was to take place under the oversight of his own officials, and that his court 
would be able to issue a sentence of blood punishment in every case — and considered in light of 
the rest of the document, this interpretation is the more likely — it was clearly at odds with the 
letter and the spirit of canon law.99 
Becket and the rest of the bishops were appalled by the canons. While canon 3 
represented the issue which had sparked the situation, many of the other canons struck at the 
same root — the question of whether the Church was answerable to any secular power for the 
regulation of its own affairs — and were objectionable to the bishops for that reason. Even those 
among them who were sympathetic to the king’s concerns on specific issues had good reason to 
hesitate before swearing an unconditional oath to a number of propositions in direct 
contradiction with canon law, whose rigid specificity left little room for further negotiation.100  
The bishops deliberated for days, and how they made up their minds is not clear. Gilbert 
Foliot, the bishop of London, provided the account written soonest after the event, and he 
described all the bishops standing united against the Constitutions until Becket suddenly 
capitulated and announced that he would perjure himself.101 Some of Becket’s biographers 
thought that he had yielded to threats of imprisonment or death. Becket did eventually agree, 
without explaining himself or consulting the other bishops, to take the oath, and to accept a 
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chirograph of the document, signifying his assent. Whatever his decision was, it was one for 
which he immediately professed remorse. Immediately after leaving Clarendon he repudiated his 
oath, donned penitential garb, and abstained from celebrating Mass; and he certainly did not 
slacken his opposition to the king’s position on clerical crime.102 
Within the next nine months, Becket’s relations with the king deteriorated so far that he 
was forced into exile. Henry brought a spurious accusation against Becket for embezzlement, 
apparently intending to inflict the maximum humiliation by involving him in the very sort of 
secular trial against which he had taken his original stand.103 Becket was given no opportunity for 
a proper legal defense, and he left the trial before hearing his sentence, denying the capacity of 
the king’s barons to pass judgment on him as a bishop: “I am your father, while you are nobles of 
the palace, lay potentates, secular persons. I will not hear your judgment.”104 Becket fled to 
France the next day, beginning six years of exile marked by diplomatic fencing among the king, 
the archbishop, and the papal curia. Becket would carry on the dispute not in person but in his 
letters to both friends and enemies. 
 
VII. Becket’s elaboration of his position in his correspondence 
 
During his exile in France, Becket had leisure to elaborate on his ideological position by 
studying theology and especially canon law.105 Becket’s correspondence presents a valuable 
contemporary record of his own views, unlike the later hagiographies heavily influenced by 
reverence for him as a martyr. His letters provide further context for his stand on the question of 
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clerical immunity and similar clerical privileges. Even if clerical immunity meant a departure 
from English custom, Becket considered it to be an accurate reflection of the supremacy of 
ecclesiastical power, whose ministers stood outside the purview of secular authority. Their 
immunity was not merely a fitting state of affairs but part of the Church’s essence, the fruit of 
Christ’s passion. 
Notably, one argument that Becket did not seriously attempt was an appeal to tradition 
for clerical immunity. On the one hand, early in the conflict, he certainly portrayed the situation 
as an unprecedented, even apocalyptic assault on the English church. Writing to Pope Alexander 
immediately after the tense scene at Westminster in October 1163, Becket painted a picture of 
descending chaos and storm. He wrote that “neither the decrees of the holy fathers nor the laws 
of the canons, whose very name is detested among us, can now protect even the clergy, who have 
been exempt hitherto from their jurisdiction by a special privilege” (apparently a reference to the 
concession in King Stephen’s 1136 charter).106 In an accompanying letter to a member of the 
papal court, he wrote:  
The liberty of Holy Church is being attacked here in so many ways that we can 
scarcely bear to see or hear them. Every day new things come forward and 
demands unheard-of in previous ages are made. The Law is silenced, and the rule 
of the canons is denied to the fellowship of the Lord; clergy are subjected to new 
laws and tossed about at the pleasure of the lay power.107  
 
Becket evidently believed Henry to have a particular vendetta against ecclesiastical liberty; in all 
his letters preserved over the six years of his exile, there are few that lack a reference to the king 
as a roaring lion seeking to subjugate the Church. 
However, as seen from the English legal history traced above, absolute clerical immunity 
did not have precedent in England farther back than a few decades, and Becket implicitly 
                                                     
106
 CTB, no. 12, p. 31. 
107
 CTB, no. 14, p. 37. 
37 
 
conceded this by declining to argue to the contrary. At no point in the course of the debate did 
Becket or his supporters attempt to prove that any specific tenet in the Constitutions of 
Clarendon contradicted the “ancient customs of the realm.”108 
Instead, like his predecessors in the Gregorian movement, Becket characterized his 
position not as restoring a previous golden age of liberty, but as working toward a new just 
ordering of society. He and his friends recalled the saying of Gratian, who was in turn quoting 
Augustine: “The Lord said in the Gospel, ‘I am the Truth.’ He did not say, ‘I am custom.’ And 
so, when truth has become manifest, let custom yield to truth.”109 In exile, Becket shifted from 
protesting that the royal demands were unprecedented to denouncing them as longstanding but 
nonetheless evil abuses. He wrote to Empress Matilda about the Constitutions of Clarendon: “If 
former kings sought them, they ought not to have sought them.”110 To Pope Alexander, he 
described the Constitutions as “customs, or rather perversions, which are not only opposed to the 
canons and the laws, but wholly inimical to the Gospel of Christ.”111 Finally, he warned the king 
himself: “The Lord says, ‘Keep my laws’; and again, he declares through the Prophet, ‘Woe to 
them who make unjust laws and set down injustices in writing to oppress the poor in judgment 
and deprive God’s humble people of their right.”112 
Becket’s fullest statement on his ideal of “right order in the world,” in Gerd Tellenbach’s 
phrase, is found in three letters addressed to the king in the summer of 1166. Becket explained 
his motivation for these letters as fatherly solicitude for the correction of an erring son. In them 
he describes his view of the clergy’s place in Christian society. 
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Becket’s position on the two powers is Gregory VII’s: “It is certain that kings receive 
their power from the Church, and the Church receives hers not from them but from Christ.” The 
Church is composed of “the clergy and the people.” Clerics have authority to “conduct 
ecclesiastical affairs so that they may direct the whole to the salvation of souls,” while secular 
princes “have the ability to conduct secular affairs, that they may bring the whole to the peace 
and unity of the Church.” Since secular rulers derive their authority from the Church, they have 
no power, among other things, to “draw clergy to secular judgments.”113 
Becket described the king’s responsibility as maintaining peace and unity; but clearly he 
did not consider clerics part of this concern, as he expressed in his third and most severe letter to 
Henry. In this letter, Becket was particularly dependent on Gratian for his authorities.114 He 
recalled the famous account of the two powers from Gelasius, although he omitted the 
qualification that the priesthood’s supremacy relates to sacramental ministry.115 He cited 
additional excerpts attributed to Gelasius: “Priests should never be judged except by the Church, 
nor is it for human laws to lay a sentence on such men;”116 and, “in fact it was always the law that 
judgments relating to priests came from priestly council. For no matter what kind of priests they 
are, even if they should fall into human error, it is never thought that they can or should be 
smitten by the secular power, as long as they do not go beyond the bounds of the faith.”117 He 
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recalled the anecdote related of Constantine, who said that a cleric was “reserved to the judgment 
of God alone” and “cannot be judged by anyone” — “meaning,” Becket added, “a secular 
judge.”118 He observed that it was unfitting to pass judgment on priests not only because of their 
roles as the fathers, teachers, and guides of secular authorities, but because they particularly 
represent the persona Christi.119 Becket nowhere addressed the possibility that members of the 
clergy might themselves pose a danger against which the Church might require the protection of 
secular power. 
The firmness of Becket’s position can be attributed in part to the fact that for him, as for 
other reformers, the temporal autonomy of the Church was not merely a congenial state of 
affairs. The libertas Ecclesiae was essential to the Church, part of the patrimony of Christ’s 
redemption. Not only did Becket remind the king that “Christ founded the Church and purchased 
her freedom with his blood,” but he wrote also to Empress Matilda that the Passion obtained the 
“privileges and dignities” of the Church.120 He told a friend that “the case which [the king] 
conducts against us is between him and God, because we seek nothing more from him than what 
the eternal God left to his Church as an everlasting testament, when he took flesh for her sake.”121 
To his fellow bishops, he described the libertas Ecclesiae as “the soul of the Church,” “without 
which the Church can neither live nor have strength.”122 He saw a close connection between 
Christ’s passion on the cross and the present struggle: he exhorted the bishops, “Let us die with 
him; let us lay down our lives to liberate his Church from the yoke of slavery and the affliction 
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of the oppressor — the Church which he founded, whose freedom he bought with his own 
Blood.”123 
Before moving on from Becket’s own expressions of his views, it is revealing to compare 
his position to the opinions of his contemporaries in the ecclesiastical world. Becket has been 
portrayed as taking a radical position on the question of clerical immunity in particular and of 
ecclesiastical liberty in general, of regressing to “pure Gregorianism” and ignoring a century of 
development and nuance since the bald assertions of the Dictatus papae. Certainly Becket 
frequently portrayed himself as the lone defender of truth contra mundum. In fact, Becket’s 
theology was no more extreme than that of other prominent churchmen of his day; it was his 
inflexibility in its practical application that alienated him from his contemporaries. 
Clerical immunity itself was widely supported by the English hierarchy. As noted above, 
it had been the accepted status quo for thirty years before Becket became archbishop. All the 
English bishops had resisted the king’s demands at Westminster, and again at Clarendon before 
Becket ordered them to follow his own capitulation. In addition, they remained united against 
further restrictions on ecclesiastical government which the king attempted to impose in 1169.124 
Pope Alexander considered several propositions of the Constitutions of Clarendon to be at least 
tolerable, but the one relating to jurisdiction over clerics he specifically condemned.125  
As for the underlying ideology of ecclesiastical autonomy, Alexander, who was in 
general tactful and diplomatic, did not scruple to write to Henry in 1166: 
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As the clergy are distinguished from the laity in manner of life and dress, so also 
is clerical jurisdiction wholly distinct from lay jurisdiction. Wherefore if you 
improperly subvert this ordering of society, and if, usurping to yourself the 
powers which belong to Jesus Christ, you establish new rules oppressive to the 
churches and the poor in Christ at your pleasure, introducing, even, those customs 
which you call ancestral, you yourself will, at the unescapable last judgment, be 
undoubtedly judged in like manner…It is not only decent for you but also 
expedient not to confound Church and State.126 
 
The ablest spokesman of the conservative tendency among the English episcopate was 
the bishop of London, Gilbert Foliot, a scholar and canonist who became Becket’s ecclesiastical 
nemesis during his six years of exile. Foliot rebuked Becket in his powerful letter Multiplicem 
nobis, where he stated the theological case for the secular power having a legitimate stake in the 
Church’s temporal interests. He pointed out that not every privilege of the Church derives from 
divine law or the fruits of the Redemption, but that “by human law the Church possesses many 
things which have been bestowed upon her by the grant of men alone,” and that the clergy are 
subject to the human rulers who are responsible for human law.127 His articulation of the Gelasian 
“two powers,” unlike Becket’s, does justice to the parity expressed in the original:  
Therefore, since there is a twin power from God, one sacerdotal, the other royal, 
they confirm by the authority of the fathers that each takes precedence of the other 
according to its nature, and can be judged by the other according to its nature.128 
 
If anyone could be expected to support the king’s right to judge a priest in temporal 
matters, it seems that it would be Foliot — but even Foliot upheld clerical immunity. At the 
height of the tension between king and episcopate in 1169, Foliot wrote to the king, 
reprimanding him for having apprehended two clerics and tactfully insisting that they be turned 
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over to the Church for trial.129 The fact that a prelate as erudite and articulate as Foliot (and one 
who personally disliked Becket) agreed with Becket on the issue for which he had taken his 
original stand, implies the breadth of its acceptance among the English clergy. 
Where Becket actually diverged from his fellow bishops, and where he drew their 
particular criticism, was his failure to adopt the attitude of tactful compromise and restraint 
which had characterized his predecessors’ relationships with previous kings. Becket lacked a 
spirit of long-sighted forbearance and the recognition that ideals must sometimes give way in 
practice, an attitude which had been implicit in the English compromise over investiture and later 
in the Concordat of Worms. By one account, Becket told the bishops at Westminster that there 
was no need to seek a compromise with the king, because Christ would come to the aid of his 
bride; he upbraided them for wishing to “make allowance for the evil of these times.”130 On the 
other hand, Becket’s fellow bishop Arnulf of Lisieux urged him not to wrangle with the king 
over legal details and reminded Becket that there was no shame in promising reverence and 
obedience to a legitimate king.131 Gilbert Foliot believed that the battle of wills at Clarendon 
could have been avoided; he argued that Henry was not absolutely opposed to negotiation over 
the prerogatives he claimed and that a tactful approach could have placated him without defying 
him outright.132 Foliot reminded Becket that longstanding customs could not be done away with 
at a blow and recalled previous bishops who secured concessions for the Church by patience and 
diplomacy: “These men would have achieved little or nothing if they had rushed to take up 
weapons.”133 As the nineteenth-century historian Frederic William Maitland said of the English 
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bishops: “Popes, and popes who were no weaklings, had taught them by precept and example 
that when we are dealing with temporal power we may temporise.”134 
In summary, Becket viewed Christian society as divided into two spheres of jurisdiction, 
with the clergy falling unequivocally under their own temporal governance as an extension of the 
liberty gained for the Church by Christ’s passion. Many of his contemporaries shared his ideal of 
a self-policing clerical class, but Becket differed from them in his rejection of the attitude of 
pragmatic compromise which had achieved earlier victories for ecclesiastical autonomy.  
 
VIII. Resolution of clerical immunity in England 
 
After Becket’s death, the dispute over clerical immunity was resolved in favor of the 
Church’s right to self-governance over clerics, but with compromises that implicitly admitted the 
inevitability of some role for secular authority in a matter which concerned the public good. 
The circumstances leading up to Becket’s murder had almost nothing to do with the 
issues surrounding clerical immunity, which in fact receded into the background during the last 
few years of the controversy. When the king and the archbishop were at last formally reconciled 
in the summer of 1170, they did not even attempt to plaster over their original disagreement — 
the Constitutions of Clarendon were passed over in complete silence.135 A few months later, 
policy questions were temporarily forgotten in the international horror over the murder of the 
archbishop. 
Clerical immunity was not discussed at the first and largely symbolic meeting between 
the king and the papal legates at Avranches in May 1172. The legates prescribed acts of 
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repentance for the king and made provisions for restitution to those who had suffered on 
Becket’s behalf. The only item of discussion directly related to the Constitutions was that the 
king agreed to not prohibit appeals to Rome, although he could still require security from anyone 
whose appeal appeared detrimental to royal interests. Significantly, Henry was not made to 
repudiate Clarendon himself before being reconciled with the Church; he was only asked to 
release the bishops from their oath. The open-ended nature of the truce implied that the 
remaining issues were to be worked out in further negotiations, as the matter of appeals had 
been. Evidently Pope Alexander did not mean to stand inflexibly on principle.136 
The specific provisions of Clarendon were addressed in the second round of negotiations 
in 1175-1176, where clerical immunity was discussed along with other clerical privileges. The 
king agreed to consign jurisdiction over clerics to the ecclesiastical courts. However, the pope 
agreed to an exception with regards to offenses committed against the forest law, an area of great 
importance to the king.137 The king conceded in principle that he did not have absolute right over 
the Church’s temporal interests in his realm, and particularly over the person of the cleric; 
however, the forest law exception granted him a good deal of the jurisdiction he had wanted 
anyway.138 
For the next phase of English history, the Church’s judicial autonomy regarding the 
clergy resembled Becket’s ideal. When a cleric was arrested for a felonious offense, he would be 
confined in the bishop’s prison, the Church would formally “claim” him before the king’s 
justices, and the ecclesiastical court would proceed to its own trial, which usually consisted of 
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compurgation.139 The division of duties proposed at Clarendon, wherein a cleric would be tried 
by the ecclesiastical court and punished by the secular court, never caught on. Rome tended to 
regard ecclesiastical penalties, like suspension from office or loss of clerical status, as 
sufficiently severe. Occasionally the courts resorted to non-sanguinary punishments such as 
imprisonment in the bishop’s prison or in a monastery.140 At first Pope Alexander III concurred 
with Becket’s objection to double punishment (At si clerici, 1178). Later, Innocent III made 
provisions for situations in which a cleric might be degraded and handed over to secular 
punishment (Novimus expedire, 1209), but as Gratian had envisioned, it was a decision left to 
ecclesiastical authority, and the Church was expected to ensure that capital punishment did not 
occur.141 
In practice, clerical immunity was subject to certain limitations. In addition to the forest 
law exception, clerical immunity came to be only applied to felonies, and minor offenses could 
still be prosecuted.142 Certain transgressions, such as illicit marriage, could result in a loss of 
privilege.143 Unlike some places on the Continent, the English church enjoyed immunity in 
criminal cases only; civil cases continued to be allocated based on the nature of the litigation.144 
The English bishops complained occasionally that the canon law was not being respected in its 
entirety, but by and large they maintained a spirit of pragmatic compromise — from which 
Becket had been an anomaly — and did not rush to provoke the English crown over every 
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transgression. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) even warned clerics against trespassing on 
secular jurisdiction in the name of the libertas Ecclesiae.145 
At the same time, ecclesiastics recognized that if they were to be credibly self-governing, 
there must be an end to the situation lamented by Empress Matilda, where bishops refused to 
prosecute clerics because they did not want to take the trouble of imprisoning them, and of cases 
like Archdeacon Osbert’s, where a lack of legal sophistication impeded the timely administration 
of justice. Pope Alexander III was the first pope to order bishops to conduct a formal judicial 
investigation of clerical crime. The Fourth Lateran Council reiterated: “We decree that prelates 
of churches should prudently and diligently attend to the correction of their subjects’ offenses, 
especially of clerics, and to the reform of morals. Otherwise the blood of such persons will be 
required at their hands.”146 The council established the inquisitorial procedure of gathering proof 
to improve the effectiveness of criminal trials.147  
Overall, although the manner in which clerical immunity was implemented in practice 
was more circumscribed than Thomas Becket would have thought decent, it broadly 
corresponded to the principles of ecclesiastical autonomy and priestly dignity which he had 
expounded. 
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IX. Postscript 
 
The Catholic Church in the last several decades, and in our local archdiocese very 
recently, has also experienced the scandal of clerical crime. As in Becket’s time, the problem is 
not unique to the clergy, but it is particularly painful to find it among those who hold a position 
of trust and moral authority in the Church. The greatest scandal has been caused when superiors 
have chosen not to approach secular law enforcement for judgment of accused priests, a course 
of action which is often interpreted as condoning and exacerbating the original crime. 
On the one hand, unlike the situation in Becket’s time, the American church is in no 
position to exercise a judicial system on par with secular civil law. Although certain concurrent 
jurisdictions are still officially recognized in the civil forum (military law, for instance), the 
Church is not one of them and cannot rely on physical coercion to enforce its laws. On the other 
hand, Becket’s ideal of a protected jurisdiction for the clergy is in some ways still implicit in 
canon law. The 1917 Code of Canon Law affirmed clerical immunity and prescribed penalties 
for anyone who compelled a cleric to come before a secular court.148 The current Code, in effect 
since 1983, omits this canon and is silent on the question of involving clerics in secular legal 
proceedings. With regards to child sexual abuse specifically, the twentieth-century Holy See 
directives on the canonical prosecution of this crime reinforced the impression of a self-
governing clerical class with exclusive competence over its own: to try an accusation against a 
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priest, every member of the judicial process also had to be a priest, and the solemn obligations of 
confidentiality suggested the avoidance of civil law involvement.149  
One revealing anecdote comes from the scandal in the Archdiocese of Dublin. In 
November 1994, a priest canonist of the Archdiocese wrote a letter to his archbishop in which he 
expressed his frustration at the way the situation was unfolding: 
It is my opinion that there is a gross over-reaction on the part of many of our 
Church authorities to this whole “paedophile crisis.” I heard the Cardinal [Cahal 
Daly] on yesterday’s radio specifically saying that, if there is a reasonable 
suspicion against a priest in this area, he should be turned over to the police for 
investigation and for whatever may follow from that. This is panic; it is also 
wrong. It takes no account whatever of the Church’s own canonical procedures in 
dealing with situations of this kind — procedures which long have been 
acknowledged and accepted by the civil courts. There is, in my view, a real 
danger in all of this that some of the local churches may, unthinkingly, try to 
solve their problems at the risk of abandoning the autonomy which the Code of 
Canon Law, now clearly based on Vatican II, has established for the Church 
itself.150 
 
This view, and in general the ecclesiastical approach to clerical sexual abuse which seems 
to have occurred in many cases — where an accused cleric was tried in secret or more often 
merely rebuked, and then quietly relocated — smacks of Becket’s defense at Westminster: 
“Clerics, by reason of order and office, have Christ alone as king…And since under their own 
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king, the King of heaven, not worldly kings, they are ruled by their own law, and if they 
transgress, are penalized by their own law, which has its own penalty.”  
It is premature to conclude based on anecdotal evidence that Becket’s convictions were 
the primary motivation for modern-day bishops and religious superiors to choose to deal with 
clerical crime in-house. For one thing, many religious institutions, not just the Catholic Church, 
have taken this attitude toward criminal behavior among their leadership.151 Still, it is difficult not 
to note the congeniality of Becket’s ideals to such an approach. If there is any lesson to be drawn, 
it might be one of caution against an attitude of regarding civil law as a hostile intruder in a 
rightfully ecclesiastical domain. It is a modest positive sign that the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith has recently encouraged bishops’ conferences to prioritize cooperation with 
civil law when dealing with cases of alleged abuse, although the Holy See has yet to issue a 
document on this issue which speaks of civil law as a positive force for justice.152 
 
X. Conclusion 
 
 Early Christianity presumed that the clergy were subject to both ecclesiastical and secular 
law, and that the punishment of crime belonged to the purview of secular authority. During the 
Gregorian reform movement, the advocates of a new ecclesiology argued for a clerical hierarchy 
which was not answerable to any secular authority, and the newly systematized canon law 
provided the theological basis for a clerical class which was exclusively self-policing in criminal 
law. Thomas Becket attempted to carry the Gregorian ideals of ecclesiastical autonomy and 
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priestly dignity to their logical conclusion by establishing clerical immunity as a political reality; 
both in personal debate and later in his correspondence, he argued that no secular authority was 
competent to impose trial or punishment on a member of the ordained clergy. After his death, the 
English church succeeded in establishing much of the exclusive self-jurisdiction for which he 
had contended. Becket’s ideals about the relationship of the clergy to the rest of Christian society 
are a caution as the Church begins to work toward healing from the scandal of clerical sexual 
abuse. 
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